The aftermarket is usually described as a manufacturing business: who can make a brake caliper cheaply, who can ship it quickly, who carries the widest catalogue. But there is a second competition running underneath the first, and it decides whether an independently made part can reach a vehicle at all. That competition is about access: to repair information, to diagnostic software, and increasingly to the data a vehicle generates about its own condition.
For brake-system parts, this is not an abstract policy debate. A booster, an ABS pump or an electro-hydraulic unit has to be diagnosed, fitted and, in some cases, coded to the vehicle. If the information and tools required to do that are controlled by the vehicle manufacturer, the independent workshop's ability to install an aftermarket part is constrained regardless of the part's quality or price.
The old bargain
Before software-defined vehicles, the automotive aftermarket operated under a regulatory compromise. Manufacturers could maintain networks of authorised dealers and repairers, and in Europe the block-exemption framework allowed certain vertical agreements while mandating access to technical repair information for independent operators, so that competition in maintenance services would not be foreclosed.
Research on access to digital car data describes this arrangement precisely: manufacturers had already partly foreclosed the maintenance market through franchising contracts with exclusive official dealers, and EU regulation endorsed that structure but required access to maintenance data for independent service providers to keep the market competitive (Martens & Mueller-Langer, 2020).
The balance was imperfect but workable. Independent garages could buy diagnostic equipment, obtain technical information and fit quality aftermarket parts. The parts market was competitive because the service market was, at least partly, open.
What digitalisation changes
The same research argues that digital car data upsets this balance. Vehicles now transmit real-time maintenance data to manufacturer servers, and manufacturers can send messages to drivers. Those capabilities can be used to price-discriminate and to increase the market share of official dealers, because the manufacturer sees the fault before the independent workshop does and can route the customer accordingly (Martens & Mueller-Langer, 2020).
The paper evaluates at least four alternative technical gateways that could give independent service providers comparable data access. Its conclusion is sobering: the alternatives suffer, in varying degrees, from data portability problems, switching costs, weak network effects, and insufficient economies of scale and scope (Martens & Mueller-Langer, 2020). In other words, a nominal right of access is not the same as effective access.
A later legal-economic analysis extends the argument. It examines whether manufacturers' digital strategies constitute gatekeeping in a functional sense and whether they justify greater regulatory attention. The authors argue that digital strategies reinforce manufacturer dominance in secondary markets, particularly repair and maintenance, and that the European Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation has not kept pace with the realities of software-defined vehicles (Hey & Zombek, 2026).
This is the competitive layer that parts manufacturers rarely see directly but always feel. If the service channel narrows, the addressable market for independent parts narrows with it.
The economics of aftermarkets
Competition authorities have studied aftermarkets for decades, and the analytical questions are well established. A background paper prepared for an OECD discussion reviews the economic debate around aftermarkets and how it has influenced legal assessment, focusing on market definition and market power (OECD, 2017).
The classic aftermarket problem is that a durable primary product and its complementary consumables or services can form separate markets. If a manufacturer has market power in the primary product and can foreclose the secondary market, consumers may pay more for service and parts than a competitive market would deliver. The legal analysis therefore turns on whether the secondary market is genuinely separate and whether the foreclosure is harmful.
Digitalisation makes that analysis harder, not easier. The "primary product" now includes software and data flows that continue after the sale, and the secondary market includes diagnostic information that the manufacturer can control in real time. The OECD framework still applies, but the facts it has to assess are moving.
Why this matters for brake parts specifically
Three features of brake-system parts make the access question unusually consequential.
First, brake work is safety-critical and increasingly diagnostic. A modern braking system may require fault-code reading, pressure-sensor calibration or coding after component replacement. A part that is mechanically correct but cannot be commissioned by the independent workshop is, in practice, a part that only the dealer channel can use.
Second, the hardware is becoming integrated. One-box electro-hydraulic braking systems combine the booster and wheel-cylinder control module and provide functions such as pedal-feel simulation, brake decoupling and failure backup (Zhao et al., 2024). The more integrated the unit, the more the replacement procedure depends on manufacturer documentation and software.
Third, the installed base is long-lived. Vehicles stay on the road for many years, and the aftermarket's role grows as they age. The regulatory rules that determine independent access in year eight of a vehicle's life decide who supplies the parts that keep it on the road.
Countervailing forces
The picture is not one-directional. Three countervailing forces are visible in the research.
The first is the maturing of the independent aftermarket itself. Work on remanufacturing in the independent aftermarket documents the challenges of core management, disassembly, cleaning, machining and testing, and the need for continuous qualification of staff and engineers as product variety and complexity grow (Casper & Sundin, 2020). The independent channel is not a passive victim of regulation; it is building technical capability, and that capability is what makes access rules usable.
The second is data capability inside aftermarket firms. Research with an automotive aftermarket small and medium-sized enterprise showed how statistical analysis and data science applied to company and sector data can produce insight of real value to stakeholders, and discussed the practical issues involved in making those solutions sustainable inside a business (Smith, Coleman, Bacardit & Coxon, 2019). Firms that can analyse their own demand, failure and fitment data are less dependent on manufacturer-provided information than firms that cannot.
The third is forecasting under disruption. A study of the Spanish automotive aftermarket developed a methodology for forecasting medium- and long-term real revenues in a transforming industry, combining regression models with participatory methods to quantify the impact of new conditioning factors, and found that stakeholder perceptions materially modulate the forecasts (Laborda & Moral, 2020). The lesson is that the aftermarket's future is not a simple extrapolation of vehicle registrations; institutional and behavioural changes matter.
What the evidence does not settle
It is worth being explicit about the limits of this literature. The empirical work on digital access is concentrated on European regulation and on the maintenance-service market, and its findings do not automatically transfer to every jurisdiction. Measuring foreclosure is also difficult: a decline in independent-service share can reflect access rules, but it can also reflect vehicle technology, technician skills, insurance arrangements or consumer preference.
The fair reading is therefore conditional. Where repair information and diagnostic access remain effective, independent parts channels retain a route to the vehicle. Where access is nominal but impractical, the route narrows even if the legal right exists. The direction of policy in Europe, and the review of the block-exemption framework, is the variable to watch (Hey & Zombek, 2026).
The competitive outlook
Taken together, the evidence supports a specific industry outlook rather than a simple "right to repair wins or loses" prediction.
Competition in aftermarket brake parts is shifting from manufacturing cost toward channel integration. The ability to manufacture a reliable part remains necessary, but it is no longer sufficient: the part has to be diagnosable, documentable and installable within the service channels that remain open. Suppliers that invest in fitment data, technical documentation and workshop-level support are building a capability that is complementary to regulatory access rather than dependent on it.
Regulation will matter, and it will differ by region. Europe's block-exemption framework is under review, and the direction of that review will shape access for independent operators in the EU (Hey & Zombek, 2026). Other markets have their own traditions and rules. For an exporter, this means that compliance and documentation requirements are becoming part of market access, in the same way that tariffs and logistics are.
The parts catalogue itself is part of the answer. A supplier that can map a part number to a vehicle application, a connector configuration and a replacement procedure is easier to integrate into any service channel, official or independent, than a supplier that ships a box with a part number on it. In a software-defined vehicle, information about the part becomes part of the product.
None of this settles the political question of who should control vehicle data. It does suggest that the competitive position of a parts manufacturer will depend increasingly on the ability to operate inside whichever access regime exists, and to make its products legible to the workshops that fit them.
Where these parts sit in the catalogue
The assemblies whose serviceability depends most directly on documentation and coding are listed in our hydraulic brake booster and hydro-boost, ABS pump and vacuum brake booster categories, each with part-number and application data.
References
- Martens, B., & Mueller-Langer, F. (2020). Access to digital car data and competition in aftermarket maintenance services. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 16(1), 116-141. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaa005
- Hey, F., & Zombek, M. (2026). Digital Control and Market Power in the Automotive Sector: OEMs, Gatekeeping, and the Future of Aftermarket Regulation. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 26(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-026-00468-x
- OECD. (2017). Competition Issues in Aftermarkets. OECD Competition Law and Policy Working Papers. https://doi.org/10.1787/82258734-en
- Zhao, X., Xiong, L., Zhuo, G., Tian, W., Li, J., Shu, Q., Zhao, X., & Xu, G. (2024). A Review of One-Box Electro-Hydraulic Braking System: Architecture, Control, and Application. Sustainability, 16(3), 1049. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16031049
- Casper, R., & Sundin, E. (2020). Electrification in the automotive industry: effects in remanufacturing. Journal of Remanufacturing, 11(2), 121-136. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13243-020-00094-8
- Smith, W. S., Coleman, S., Bacardit, J., & Coxon, S. (2019). Insight from data analytics with an automotive aftermarket SME. Quality and Reliability Engineering International, 35(5), 1396-1407. https://doi.org/10.1002/qre.2529
- Laborda, J., & Moral, M. J. (2020). Automotive Aftermarket Forecast in a Changing World: The Stakeholders' Perceptions Boost! Sustainability, 12(18), 7817. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12187817
